SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NASSAU: TRIAL TERM PART 3

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In the Matter of JESSE FRIEDMAN,

Index No. 4015/13

Petitioner,

-against-

KATHLEEN M. RICE, in her official Capacity as the NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY,

Respondent,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

August 22, 2013 Mineola, New York

B E F O R E : HON. F. DANA WINSLOW,

Justice.

APPEARANCES:

LAW OFFICE OF RONALD KUBY
By: RONALD KUBY, ESQ.
LEAH BUSBY, ESQ.
LINDA TVRDY, ESQ.
For Petitioner

NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
By: ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, ADA
JUDITH R. STEINBERG, ADA
For Respondent

ALSO PRESENT:

GARY SCHOER, ESQ. For Witness Number 14

> Lisa M. Porteus, RPR Official Court Reporter

1	THE COURT: All right. Let the record reflect
2	that this is a continuation of a hearing commenced at the
3	beginning of 2003 in one fashion or another. The last
4	time that we were here on June 28th, this was the date at
5	which certain things were scheduled to occur. I have an
6	outline generally that I wished to follow, but I'm going
7	to deviate from it immediately and probably will
8	consistently throughout the proceedings.
9	First thing is that I do understand that Mr.
10	Schoer is in the courtroom, and Mr. Schoer has forwarded
11	a letter that the Court wishes very much to have further
12	explained, and also to have his notice of appearance
13	noted on the record since he has officially appeared, as
14	the Court sees by his prior communication.
15	Mr. Schoer, sir.
16	MR. SCHOER: Good morning, your Honor. Gary
17	Schoer, S-C-H-O-E-R. 6800 Jericho Turnpike, Syosset, New
18	York.
19	THE COURT: Yes, please.
20	MR. SCHOER: Judge, I submitted an affirmation
21	in opposition to the petition which
22	THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHOER: -- which your Honor should have received. I represent the person who's been identified as witness number 14 in the District Attorney's report,

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and my client's position is that he does not wish any of the reports, any of the records that have been requested by the petitioner to be released, that he would like his privacy to be maintained, and that he supports the District Attorney's position not to release any of the police reports or the Grand Jury testimony.

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THE COURT: All right. With respect to him.

MR. SCHOER: With respect to him.

THE COURT: Okay. You are, I know, very much aware of Brady and its successors and the changes that have taken place over the many years since 1988, and also the recantations — because that's what they're called — by different parties in this case. In fact, at one point or another both sides have utilized that term, non-recantation or recantation. And I do want to be sure that this is a privacy issue that is being asserted in connection with the application that is now being made by you. Is that correct?

MR. SCHOER: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Kuby, you wish to be heard?

MR. KUBY: Yes, thank you, Judge.

I've spoken to Mr. Schoer, and I submitted a clarification of something Mr. Schoer said in his affirmation, and the clarification I submitted was that

his client, witness 14, also known as Barry Doe for purposes of our discussion, as he was named in the original indictment, that Barry Doe is not alleging that Jesse Friedman committed a criminal act against him.

That's something Mr. Schoer told me on behalf of his client. I put it in papers. I just want to confirm that Mr. Schoer stands by the statement that he made to me informally.

MR. SCHOER: My client's memory would support that statement.

MR. KUBY: Thank you.

MR. SCHOER: At this time.

MR. KUBY: Thank you.

The victims of a sex crime, if we're going to apply that term to Barry Doe -- and I've suggested that, notwithstanding his recantation, he probably is a victim in the eyes of the law -- they get to be heard. They don't get a veto on release of documents. But, nonetheless, we are very, very, very cognizant of Barry Doe's desire to make certain that his real name and whatever allegations he actually made beyond those in the indictment, that those do not come to public scrutiny. I understand his situation, I understand his profession, I understand his family situation. I actually understand it really well, because he already spoke to the

filmmakers in this case, gave them extensive interviews where he said, among other interviews, as God is my witness he was never molested or seen anyone molested.

We've maintained out of discretion, not out of compulsion, his identity and his anonymity. We've maintained that privacy even though we're under no constraints whatsoever to do so. We're not public officials. 50B doesn't apply to us, although it does apply to the DA's office. I could shout his name from the rooftops. Wouldn't do it, haven't done it, not going to do it. So in terms of protecting his privacy, we know who he is.

The only issue is what were the specifics of his various statements. And, of course, the statements — and this is a theme that perhaps I'll return to. Perhaps you've heard it enough. But I'll say it this time. The statements themselves are protected only to the extent that they reveal the identity of the person. That's the — that is the singular and sole protection provided by the Civil Rights Law.

We know the identity. Mr. Schoer doesn't deny we know the identity. Certainly his client knows we know his identity, because he sat down with us. So the only thing that's being protected are the specific contents of his statements, and that's not protectable except to the

extent that it conveys his identify, which we know already.

Now, if the Court wants to actually give Barry
Doe more protection than Barry Doe has now, the Court can
do something, although I'm not wild about the idea, quite
frankly, but your power to condition disclosure upon
conditions appears by the statute to be plenary. I mean,
probably you couldn't exceed the bounds of the
constitution. You couldn't say, well, you can't disclose
it to anybody of a particular race or religion. But,
short of that, you can impose any condition you want.

And one condition you can impose is that, yes, you will give us the Barry Doe documents, conditioned upon everybody receiving them abides by an order of the Court that Barry Doe's actual name will not be revealed by us without further court order. And that actually gives Barry Doe a legal protection that he does not have right now.

Again, I would prefer that you trust our discretion because we've proven ourselves to be trustworthy. But if you elect to trust-verify you can issue that order, and it's punishable by the Court's contempt power.

THE COURT: All right.

And now, Mr. Schwartz, I'd very much like to

1 hear from you.

MR. SCHWARTZ: With all due respect, your Honor, this was petitioner's application, and I believe that they should be heard first. I have nothing to say in response to Mr. Schoer's statement, but with respect to the petition, I would ask that petitioner make his application and we would respond to that.

MR. KUBY: I'm sorry, didn't I just speak? I mean, am I --

MR. SCHWARTZ: Is that the --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Mr. Schwartz, I think that the position that was taken by the petitioner was one that was articulated maybe even more clearly than usual. But at least, at least, it was understandable.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Okay, your Honor. If that was the extent of their argument, then I'm obviously prepared to go forward here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I thought it was limited to the statement that Mr. Schoer had made.

THE COURT: The limitation, as I understand it, is that the petitioner would, in fact, consent to the receipt of all of Barry Doe's -- we'll call him Barry Doe -- information but never his -- but not his name. His name will remain sacrosanct or will, more aptly,

1	remain confidential. Is that incorrect?
2	MR. KUBY: Correct.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Schwartz?
4	MR. SCHWARTZ: And I would object to that, your
5	Honor.
6	THE COURT: On what basis?
7	MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, because you know this
8	proceeding was brought to you because a FOIL request was
9	made, and the people, the DA's office, denied the FOIL
10	request. And now it seems that petitioner wants to
11	discuss everything but FOIL and everything but the Public
12	Officers Law. I know in their 34 page reply papers they
13	never once mentioned FOIL or the Public Officers Law, and
14	in our papers we rely heavily on the provisions of the
15	Public Officers Law to oppose disclosure of these
16	records.
17	What Mr. Kuby keeps ignoring, because he knows
18	he can't win if he addresses this issue, is that the 50B
19	is not the only provision that prohibits disclosure of
20	THE COURT: You're talking about 2068 of the
21	Public Officers Law, correct?
22	MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm talking about section 87.2(e).
23	THE COURT: Excuse me, you're absolutely
24	correct.
25	MR. SCHWARTZ: 2(e)iii, which is one of the law

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enforcement exemptions.

And, your Honor, Mr. Kuby keeps saying that only the identity of the victim is protected. But 87.2(e)iii protects a confidential source or confidential information relating to a criminal investigation.

Now, we cited an abundance of Appellate

Division case law discussing that provision. And all
those cases say, very simply, the statements of a
nontestifying witness are exempt from disclosure.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Schwartz, but that's precisely why I asked Mr. Schoer what the basis of his position was, why was he taking this position on behalf of his client. And Public Officers Law 87.2(e)iii is confined, confined to something that is actually going on at this point, divulging of a confidential source. There is no confidential source -- because it has two aspects to it. There's no confidential source because the name is being withheld. It is the information that is available through the institution involved, and not, and not, the name that is at this moment -- because of Mr. Kuby's waiver -- at issue.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, with all due respect, I think you're incorrect on the law there. I would point out one case in particular, Esposito v. Rice. It's a case in my papers. It's a case that went to the

1	Second Department. It was similar to this case. It was
2	a 20-year-old conviction on a homicide case. The
3	defendant said, I need this witness statement to prove my
4	innocence. This was a person that gave a statement to
5	the police and never testified at trial. We argued
6	87.2(e)iii, and the Court again reiterated, statements of
7	nontestifying witnesses are exempt. It doesn't matter if
8	there's a pending criminal investigation. It protects
9	the people that have come forward and have spoken to the
10	police, whether it's last year or 20 years ago or 25
11	years ago.
12	If they want their statement released, that's
13	fine. But they don't want their statements released.
14	THE COURT: As I heard, Mr. Schoer, there is no
15	request on your part to withhold statements so long as
16	they don't identify your client; correct?
17	MR. SCHOER: No, Judge. I don't think I said
18	that.
19	THE COURT: All right.
20	MR. SCHOER: You asked me whether or not the
21	basis of my client's

THE COURT: Was privacy.

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MR. SCHOER: Was privacy. And I said yes. But I also said that my client supports the non-release of any documents and supports the position of the District

1 Attorney's Office.

THE COURT: All right. So I then -- I thank you for your clarification.

I turn back to you. 87 is Public Officers Law.
MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.

THE COURT: It has nothing to do with the individual involved that is being represented by Mr. Schoer. Does it?

MR. SCHWARTZ: It absolutely does. That's what's protected. Again, it's a provision in the Public Officers Law. That's the statute that governs FOIL.

That's the statute that says everything gets disclosed unless it falls within one of these categories. And one of the categories is, if I can paraphrase the Appellate Court decisions, statements made by a witness to law enforcement when the witness hasn't testified. Of course, if the witness testifies at trial, the confidentiality of that statement is lost, that statement is disclosed, and we can't rely on that. But it protects statements of witnesses, and it's not just -- I think I cited another case, Johnson v. Heinz. It says it's not just the identity, it's the content of the statement.

THE COURT: You may have cited cases, Mr. Schwartz. I will say, however, that the cases are distinguishable in many respects. So it is your

position, so that we don't spend the rest of the day on this particular aspect, it is your position that there is nothing that should be released, even though there's an assertion of a privacy right. That is the nature of the concern in the case of Mr. Schoer. Correct?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Judge, I'm asserting -
THE COURT: I'm saying it for clarification purposes.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I'm asserting that various records are exempt for various reasons. Right now we're talking about the statements of witnesses to law enforcement. And those are exempt.

Now, Mr. Schoer talks about privacy, and he's not limiting his privacy right to 87.2(e)iii or 50B, he's saying, my client gave a statement to the police, I don't want it released under any circumstances. And I'm sure his client would rely on any and all statutes that avail him of that privacy.

THE COURT: The Court does have a number of cases that it has seen in this particular area and, as I said, I wish to proceed on. But before I do, I want to respond to Mr. Kuby's letter. This is a little bit out of order, because he asked that the three, the three letters forwarded to the Court be made available to him and, of course, to you. And I said that will be

addressed at this hearing.

The Court is taking the following position with respect to those letters because they fall into certain categories. We know basically what Mr. Schoer's position is. As to the other two, those letters were sent to the Court -- no carbon copies were sent anyplace else, as far as the Court is aware -- with the singular request that their name not be disclosed or information be used.

Now, that is a question that the Court has to consider in its balancing, the balancing that even District Attorney Rice agrees exists, that we -- that there be a consideration given to the victims, as you have identified them at times, or the complainant, or the complaining witnesses, because they have had multiple identifications. They have to be protected. And on the other side, Mr. Friedman has to be protected, depending upon the facts.

So this, in effect, is a fact determination that is before this Court. Is there the disclosure of facts that have been requested under FOIL that would allow the petitioner the opportunity to do a few things?

Before I get there, unfortunately I think that one aspect has been neglected in this case for both sides, and it's not in the nature of a criticism or even of an oversight. It is that there have been two sides,

1	warring sides, 180 degrees apart. The petitioner did it,
2	the petitioner should be punished. Other side; the
3	petitioner didn't do it, the complaining witnesses have
4	to be properly protected.
5	But the third side, which hasn't been
6	addressed, is the side that if, if, only if and you'll
7	see why I say it in this particular context if, in
8	fact, the complaining witnesses were mistaken or
9	misstated a position, gave statements, provided
10	information to the District Attorney, to the Nassau
11	County Police Department, they have also been living for
12	25 years with that knowledge.
13	MR. SCHWARTZ: May I be heard on that, your
14	Honor?
15	THE COURT: You certainly may.
16	MR. SCHWARTZ: I've said this before, and if
17	your Honor disagrees
18	THE COURT: Not in this context, sir.
19	MR. SCHWARTZ: What I'm about to say I've said
20	before.
21	THE COURT: Okay.
22	MR. SCHWARTZ: If your Honor disagrees with me,
23	that's
24	THE COURT: I will clearly let you know if I
25	do.

MR. SCHWARTZ: That's obviously your right.

But I feel like I have to emphasize this for the umpteenth time.

This is here because of a FOIL request. We are not here relitigating petitioner's guilt. That may or may not occur sometime in the future.

THE COURT: I'm going to stop you right there, as I always do both of you, when we come to a point that I need clarified or I would like to clarify myself.

Of course I'm aware of that fact. The problem with taking that position in vacuum or isolation is that there is a great deal of information, and we're becoming more and more aware of it as time progresses, but there's a great deal of information that can be used in a couple of different ways.

As I know you are very much aware, not only was Mr. Jesse Friedman pleading in 1988, not only was there a sentence, or, more aptly, a portion of a sentence, a portion of a sentence imposed, it is the plea and the sentence that collectively constitutes a conviction or judgment. If you plead or you're convicted after trial, until the sentence there is no -- there isn't finality with respect to that particular Court. That need not even be said in this courtroom, except to those who may not be as conversant as you are, Mr. Schwartz, with the

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You also know that in 2002, after Mr. Friedman had been released from prison -- he was released in 2001, December of 2001. In December of 2002 he was determined to be a Level 3 Sexual Offender. Is that correct?

MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, two things. First, that was really the first conviction. I want you to think about it, because in effect his jail sentence didn't end when he left Coxsackie, his jail sentence continued to this very day. That's not to indicate that for one moment this Court has any sympathy for Mr. Friedman or for anyone in that matter. And I notice the smile on your face, Mr. Schwartz, and I suggest that you remove it rather quickly, because it is very clearly the case that this Court is going to hold both parties to the highest degree possible. I have had the fortune, misfortune, of reading thousands of pages of Social Science. I enjoy it immensely. But it was an intricate part of your presentation and it was an intricate part of the petitioner's presentation. In fact, you even used some of the same sources.

So I get to the point that I was raising with you, sir, and that is that the Court believes that under that particular provision of the law, the Sexual Offender

Law, that was part of the conviction process.

By the way, never once has another Court decided this in the United States, as far as I know.

This would be the first determination anywhere, but I don't want to stop there, because of the implications of that law.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Judge, can I --

THE COURT: No.

You understand also under the Sexual Predators
Law or offender -- rather, the Sexual Offenders Law, that
there is an annual application available to the sexual
offender. So a sexual offender can go from a level 3 to
a 2, to a 1, to a zero, not a sexual offender. It
provides a need for this case to look closely at every
single aspect that was used in the conviction process.

I will show this austere, this august -- maybe austere, too, but august group the reason why there are so many multiples that look at this as necessitating the release of information not formerly.

In connection with that, and addressing your letter, Mr. Schwartz, in response to Mr. Kuby's letter that was sent to the Court about the three letters that were sent directly to the Court, this Court wrote a letter that is going to become an exhibit, and will be available to any, in which it will fill in the blanks,

and essentially provides the following: Do you wish to have any information made available? I suggest in this letter that the recipient even speak with the therapist or anyone, get any help that he or she may desire.

The notation at the bottom of this letter I think is the most important one for our immediate discussion: Your answers may affect this Court's determination of the release of any information regarding you.

That's what I would be telling them, that it may, not that it will. I have said throughout I have an obligation, I have to look at your -- the case law, I have to look at the facts, I have to balance the two warring interests in this case and come to a conclusion.

All right.

MR. SCHWARTZ: May I please respond to just something your Honor said?

THE COURT: You may, certainly.

MR. SCHWARTZ: You commented a moment ago about a smile on my face, and it certainly was not my intent to disrespect this Court in any way. And if I had a smile, I apologize, your Honor.

THE COURT: You never have.

MR. SCHWARTZ: And I certainly don't take light of the fact that Mr. Friedman has to register as a sex

offender. That's a tremendous burden.

But what I will say is this. And you compared it to being a form of continued incarceration. Even if Mr. Friedman were still in prison, as was the petitioner in Esposito v. Rice, it doesn't change the FOIL issue one iota. Because the Court of Appeals has said not once, not twice, not three times, the status of the person making a request for records under FOIL is irrelevant. And it doesn't matter if they're an incarcerated prisoner who says I desperately need the information to prove my innocence. The status of the person making the request is as a member of the general public. And it doesn't matter that they know the identity of the persons whose reports they're seeking.

THE COURT: I'm going to stop you, because you had a moment's pause.

Does it make any difference that at one point in time the District Attorney's Office, in 1988 -- `87, `88 -- sent a full and complete list of all of the -- by the way, 17 complaining witnesses. We've been dancing around these figures all along. But I have 17 affidavits of service which were made on 17 people around the world in order to comply with the provisions of the Civil Rights Law.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I could answer that question

1 very simply, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Good. MR. SCHWARTZ: The answer is no. And I just 3 want to quote for you one sentence from Fabiano versus 5 New York City Police Department. That's a Court of Appeals case from 2001. 6 7 Nor does the fact that petitioners already know the identity of their victims provide a basis for 8 disclosure. The original goal of Civil Rights Law 50B, which is to protect the privacy of sex crimes victims, 10 11 cannot be negated by a litigant's assertion that he knows 12 the identity of the victim. 13 That's a Court of Appeals case, your Honor. And it's been repeated over and over again. 14 15 THE COURT: No, it has not been repeated over 16 and over again. Portions of it have been used many times for many purposes. But it is not something that the 17 18 Court of -- the Appellate Division has adopted wholesale. It has interpreted and has decided that, I think at long 19 20 last, that Brady material consists not only of substantive material that may tend to show that the 21 22 defendant did not commit the crime, but also impeachment.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, I don't disagree with that. But --

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. SCHWARTZ: But Brady comes up in the context of a criminal trial. It doesn't come up in the context of a FOIL request. And that's why the courts say your need for the records, even if you claim it's Brady material, is irrelevant.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Because if, in fact, you're saying there is no criminal aspect to this matter, then there cannot be a finding of sexual offender level 3. That is a criminal matter, as well. It is a prohibition against the petitioner having contact, living close to, being in the proximity of children and others, including his own. He can't have his own.

Now, that being the case, it is -- and maybe we should herald back to Tony Soprano. There is a time when Tony Soprano and Junior and others walk around with bracelets in their house. They were far freer than Mr. Friedman was, because they had the house, they could make the telephone calls, they could make a call and leave. But they weren't free to -- they weren't free, and neither is Mr. Friedman free, to go where he wished, when he wished, so long as it didn't constitute a criminal act.

But what we're looking at is the notice of the petition, and the petition is requesting the records with response to the September 19, 2012 request, all of the

records, and directing respondent to provide petitioner with the entire case file of its prior investigation, and granting the release to petitioner of the records and minutes of Jesse Friedman.

Now, since you are there, I am most anxious to receive from you the Department of Corrections violation that was the topic for far too long, in my view, in our last hearing, in which the Court ordered a certified copy so it knew, was there a violation. And the Court believed that it — there may not have been any overriding need other than the Court needing to see that piece of information because, Mr. Schwartz, you considered it so important, Mr. Kuby, you considered it so important, but more particularly, all of the written submissions considered it important, so important. Every single one of the submissions made, all of the affidavits in opposition, affidavits in support, memorandum or memoranda of law contain references to it.

Do you have that, the official records of a violation that occurred on June 28th, 2013, that the Court requested?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't have any records regarding that beyond what Mr. Kuby provided on the last court appearance.

THE COURT: Let me just refresh your

1 recollection, then. You said that Mr. Kuby wrote in, no, 2 or did something -- maybe it wasn't Mr. Kuby himself, but it was somebody from his office if it wasn't Mr. Kuby. 3 That's what I'm asking. Remember that part? 5 MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, your Honor. And I did have 6 someone from my office call the Department of Corrections 7 and make inquiry. They did confirm that he was found not 8 guilty of that charge. MR. KUBY: Thank you. MR. SCHWARTZ: But they couldn't provide any 10 11 additional information regarding the circumstances. THE COURT: So all of the information contained 12 13 in the report and the advisory report, with references that would appear to rely on it because it used it, has 14 15 to be questioned. Is that right? MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I stand by what I just 16 He was found not guilty --17 said. 18 THE COURT: No, Mr. -- no. MR. SCHWARTZ: But, your Honor --19 20 THE COURT: One of the things that I know that 21 you know, you have to answer my question. It was a 22 perfect deflection. I congratulate you for that. But 23 the congratulations end there. 24 That was an important part of the totality of 25 the submissions, whether it should or should not have

1	been, because he's a bad guy is the best way to say it.
2	He's a bad guy. Look at what he did. And the Department
3	of Corrections let the record reflect that the
4	District Attorney's Office is nodding his head, and I
5	assume that it is in agreement, or at least tacit
6	agreement. Fair enough, sir?
7	MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know that I was nodding

MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know that I was nodding my head intentionally, your Honor. So I can't agree to that statement.

THE COURT: Do you agree that it was used in some fashion in making determinations in this case?

MR. SCHWARTZ: It was included in the report, but I think it was actually a very small part of the report.

THE COURT: Oh, how small? On a scale of one to ten, was it a one, two, five, six, eight? Tell me the number if you can.

MR. SCHWARTZ: In the scheme of the whole 150-something page report, I would say it's probably a one or a two.

THE COURT: One or two. I will accept the two, and say to you, then, under those circumstances this

Court has the right to remove any two or three pages it wants until it reaches what figure? 90 percent? 95

percent?

We can't, we can't, function in the judicial system in this fashion. This is a country that at this point has no -- and I emphasize that -- has no feeling of credibility towards its institutions. That starts with the lowest and goes to the highest. We don't trust our institutions. You have to show, you have to prove, and that's what the country is saying. If it isn't saying it in a loud voice, it's saying it by staying out of the fray.

All right. The material that was provided -this is a real problem, Mr. Schwartz, for the Court -- do
you recall that counsel for the petitioner in 1987 and
1988 requested Brady material and the ADA said there is
none, none at that time?

You asked Mr. -- and I will use his name -- Mr. Panaro to trust you, trust that there is no Brady material. At this point in time I don't believe that you're saying that there is nothing in the 17,365 pages that this Court has received in the form of documents that doesn't have some Brady material, and I'm talking about the unredacted portion, the portion that Mr. Kuby didn't see. But even in the redacted portion there is some material.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, I think this is an important point.

1	THE COURT: Oh, thank you.
2	MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, what you said was
3	obviously important. I hope what I'm about to say is
4	important, as well.
5	The issue of Brady has come up time and time
6	again over the years. It was raised in 2004, in
7	petitioner's motion to vacate his judgment. And that was
8	heard by a Judge. And the Judge found there was no
9	THE COURT: You know why I'm holding up three
10	fingers?
11	MR. SCHWARTZ: No, Judge.
12	THE COURT: I think you do, because what the
13	Court said was, Mr. Friedman, you missed by three months.
14	MR. SCHWARTZ: No, Judge, that's not that's
15	not that's not the motion I'm talking about.
16	THE COURT: Oh, a different motion. You're
17	talking about not the one that came out of the Court of
18	Appeals in which they said this should bear further
19	scrutiny?
20	MR. SCHWARTZ: No, Judge, I'm not referring to
21	that at all. I'm going to get to that, though, if you
22	just give me a chance, please.
23	THE COURT: Well, chances are for those who are
24	either permitted or taken. Go ahead.
25	MR. SCHWARTZ: Judge, before this case went to

1 Federal Court it started -- the post-conviction 2 litigation started in County Court, Nassau County Court. 3 THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. SCHWARTZ: And they raised the Brady claim. 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. SCHWARTZ: And the Judge reviewed it and 7 rejected it. Okay. They took that case to Federal Court. And the 8 Second Circuit, yes, they found the petition untimely. 10 But they also reviewed the Brady claim. And if you read 11 the Second Circuit decision -- I know you have. I'd ask 12 you to read it again -- they found the Brady claim 13 meritless because you don't have a right to Brady material if you don't go to trial. 14 THE COURT: In the Second Circuit. 15 every circuit agreed, and there have been changes with 16 respect to Brady material and when it must be provided. 17 18 If I had the opportunity at this moment, I 19 would very much like to hear -- but we're not going to do 20 it now -- I would very much like to hear your position as to whether or not in a serious case, at least, pre-plea 21 22 in response to a demand by the defendant, exculpatory or 23 Brady material should be provided. The Court does think

that some of the circuits are getting it right.

Unfortunately, they're closer to the Mississippi than we

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LMP

are.

So at this point, your point, sir?

MR. SCHWARTZ: My point is the issue of Brady has been litigated. It's been litigated in the County Court, it's been litigated in the Second Circuit. It has no business in this proceeding, your Honor.

And I've said this and I'll say it again.

Whether or not Brady material -- whether or not the material requested under FOIL would or could be Brady does not change their entitlement to it. We're not in a criminal proceeding. We're not in a criminal trial.

This was a FOIL request. And the nature of the material, the Brady material, is irrelevant.

THE COURT: All right. At this point in time the Court most respectfully disagrees and does find that under these peculiar circumstances -- they may not be peculiar in the fact that they are -- they have occurred with infrequency, but peculiar in the sense of it being brought to the attention of a Court.

The next question the Court asked before, and I did not get a position from you, is regarding Correction

Law 18602, any sex offender required to register may petition the sentencing Court to modify the level of notification, and that could be done on an annual basis.

Does that, in fact, extend the criminal

aspects? At least arguably, doesn't it extend the criminal aspects of this case beyond what you characterized as civil, meaning FOIL? The Court has a question as to whether or not FOIL is civil or criminal or quasi-criminal. But whatever it turns out to be, that will be determined in another Court or by a legislature.

Please.

MR. SCHWARTZ: No, Judge, it doesn't extend the criminal case. It's no different, as I said before, whether the petitioner was still incarcerated. It doesn't extend the criminal case.

And the Court of Appeals says it, again frequently, a guilty plea marks the end of a criminal case. It's not a gateway to further litigation.

THE COURT: But you know that they didn't mean it in the context that that's the end of the case, you're not going to sentence him, the case is over, you're guilty, you took a plea, good-bye, have a good life.

MR. SCHWARTZ: The context in which they meant it -- and I didn't finish the quote -- was that the issue of factual guilt is removed from the case. And that's what we're doing here, we're revisiting the factual guilt. And that's gone.

THE COURT: But Ms. Rice wanted to do precisely that. She said, following the determination made by the

United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, I want to get to the bottom of this, too, I want to look at it and I'm using the Brady standard, the Brady standard, as a lower standard to look at the entire case.

Now, I think that most of you have gotten a flavor for what has transpired in the past, and it is important now to move on from this Court's perspective to the following.

First. There was a letter sent, received by this Court, which came from the law secretary to Abby Boklan. That letter effectively requests that the Court allow the petition to proceed. It was the case that the author of that letter did read — in fact, he's one of the few people who did read the Grand Jury transcripts. He did voice some concern at one point or another. The Court was very much concerned that he did not, however, follow that up with any additional action. But he did send this Court a letter, a copy of which all of you have. And those of you who don't have it, I don't have to provide a copy because it's on the internet.

So at this point we know what the only living person who was involved to the intimate degree that the Judge herself was has to say about the facts and circumstances surrounding the 19 -- December 1988 plea.

But the Court is also in receipt of a letter

from Arlene -- from one person who I understand is present, and who may wish to say something one way or another. And I am not going to inhibit that, certainly. Does the person who wrote the letter, copy of which was sent to the District Attorney and to the petitioner, wish to say something?

MR. KUBY: Judge, Ms. Epstein -- she's consented to the use of her name -- Ms. Epstein is not present. She said what she had to say in writing and --

THE COURT: All right. That's what the Court was here to find out, either way.

The letter that she sent was to say -- at least a letter that this Court found to be compelling to the degree not that it accepts word for word what was said, but that it creates the -- and supports the argument that there is insufficient information.

The Court, after reading numerous witnesses' statements, none of which were written by the witness him or herself, all of which were written by someone else, finds that even the people -- and they are people, no longer children -- who took the position that they did not want their name disclosed, had some glaring discrepancies in parts of the statements given. Most particularly what comes to mind is a statement given at one point in time and then -- to one detective and then

later given to another detective thereafter. There was a rather substantial difference.

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The Court also finds something else. First, what everybody who has been involved with this matter has seen -- but until there is a greater emersion it may not have the same effect -- that there was no physical evidence, no photographs. Yes, I understand that there are reasons why there may not be physical evidence. Yes, I understand that there may be reasons why there are no photographs. But instead of just saying there aren't any and that's enough, it means that we have to look closer and not further away. We have to start using a microscope instead of a telescope to look at the facts in order to see whether or not they truly make sense, the timeline makes sense, the fact that so many of the complaining witnesses say time and again everybody in the classroom was present when certain things happened, and total denial.

What the Court has seen also is that there are more recantations than there are affirmations of the statements previously made. If we go on the balancing basis, if we hold hearings with each and every one of the individual complainants, we may not progress any further than we are now. If everything is open as was intended by FOIL, everything is open to the petitioner.

Now, the Court still maintains that it owes the duty to the three parties that have communicated with it, one who filed an affirmation in opposition. I have serious reservations, as you know, Mr. Schoer, about the privacy right being invoked on these circumstances, but I will give you the benefit of that doubt for the moment.

And I have every intention of sending the letters to the two who sent letters to the Court.

In conclusion -- and I am going to ask for a response from both -- because I'm a clock watcher, but I watch the person who works harder than anybody else, our court reporter. I am giving the conclusion now, subject to something that somebody may say that will change the dynamics as I have outlined them already.

It is hereby ordered that the District Attorney of Nassau County provide all documents, records of all kinds including the Grand Jury minutes, redacting only the names of the complaining witnesses that I will, in fact, provide, work out with counsel, who have previously contacted this Court, that's -- those are the only names. We sent out 17, we served 17. Some were served pursuant to -- and even Mr. Kuby learned something about the CPLR. We served some pursuant to CPLR 308(1), we served some pursuant to the Hague Convention, and we served them all over -- in all different ways to assure that actual

service was effected.

If the District Attorney wishes to appeal this order, I want the District Attorney, who has made an outstanding presentation -- no one can ever doubt that this was done with great fervor. If they wish to appeal the order, it should be noted that this Court will not stay it. Any stay that occurs will have to be obtained by the Appellate -- from the Appellate Division by 2:00, August 30th. That's Monday. That's only if it chooses to proceed in such a fashion.

During such time, no document of any kind may be moved re-filed or in any way handled, touched by anyone in the District Attorney's Office. This is a stay-away for that. I want to be sure that there is preservation, just as the District Attorney wanted the same kind of assurance from the Court. We have locked everything up, we've made sure that all non-redacted or unredacted material is locked up tight.

Please be further advised that this Court has requested the original stenographic notes that were taken in the proceeding -- I held this off to the very end -- the stenographic notes that were taken of the proceedings regarding the petitioner in 1988 at the plea. Let me give you the history, just for a moment.

Stenographic notes were taken by the Gregg

method or one of the methods of taking stenographic notes. They were then transcribed and then utilized by the parties. In this particular case, since on the record -- wherever that record may be -- on the record there is purportedly a waiver of any right to appeal, and that's why I had some of the other concerns that I just didn't voice before. Since there was no appeal, there was no transcription. But that doesn't mean destruction, as we keep hearing about. The stenographic notes were sent to Albany and then maybe Utah and maybe Taiwan. I have no idea. They are being tracked at this very moment, and I hope to have and will, of course, share with the parties such stenographic notes or materials as this Court receives.

At this point is there anything that you wish to say, Mr. Kuby?

MR. KUBY: Only this, Judge. That in order to expedite this process, we will conditionally agree to redact the three names of the three people who have requested that redaction, subject to the Court retaining jurisdiction. And after you send your letter and after they respond, which is going to take a period of time, the Court may change its order and release the names to us. But in order to get this moving we're happy to agree preliminarily to those redactions, so in the absence of

1	an appeal we can proceed to inspect these documents on
2	September 1st. And I'm calendar-challenged. August 30th
3	is
4	THE COURT: August 30th.
5	MR. KUBY: Is a Monday or a
6	THE COURT: A Friday. It's excuse me, then
7	it would be the 2nd, isn't it? What's Monday? Today's
8	Thursday. What's Monday?
9	THE CLERK: This Monday is the 26th.
10	THE COURT: The 26th.
11	MR. KUBY: Thank you, Judge.
12	MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor?
13	THE COURT: Yes, sir? Please, Mr. Schwartz.
14	MR. SCHWARTZ: Just so there's no there
15	certainly is some confusion on my part regarding the
16	Court's order. I would ask that if the Court could put
17	it in writing so that I have it, so there is no miss
18	there is no confusion on my part as to what exactly
19	you're ordering us to disclose.
20	THE COURT: If there is a doubt on your part,
21	it is every aspect, every part, every piece of paper that
22	has been generated in the matter of People against Jesse
23	Friedman, the 1987, 1988 case. Except that there may be
24	redaction of two, and a total of three, including Mr.

Schoer's client. And that is on consent. And the Court

will be pleased to give you the names of the three
complaining witnesses for which redaction is appropriate.

Otherwise every single document.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I would ask, your Honor, that we

MR. SCHWARTZ: I would ask, your Honor, that we get an order in writing so that if we do file a notice of appeal we have a written order from which to appeal from.

well aware, being such an astute advocate, there is no longer an obligation by the Second Department to have a written order, that the transcript itself is sufficient.

And if, in fact, there is a need for a conference call, I think you have all of my telephone numbers, both of you.

And, if not, then you can certainly obtain them after this proceeding is concluded.

I do want to note for the record that this must be one of Mr. Kuby's most succinct responses in his long history of advocacy.

MR. SCHWARTZ: Your Honor, please, I just have one more request. In lieu of the fact that you're not giving us a written order, and I need to get the minutes --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SCHWARTZ: -- to file a notice of appeal, and you've only given us until Monday, I'm kind of hamstrung here.

THE COURT: Would you like it at 5:00 instead

of 2?

MR. SCHWARTZ: I would like an additional week, if that's possible, your Honor, and it would depend on how quickly the court reporter can get me the minutes.

THE COURT: This Court reporter is known for her accuracy and speed. She can have those notes available within minutes of your departure from the courtroom.

MR. SCHWARTZ: In any event, your Honor, if I could have to August 30th, which was the original date you mentioned.

THE COURT: That was an accident.

MR. SCHWARTZ: I understand, but I would ask for that anyway. I don't know that there's that much urgency in a few days.

THE COURT: The reason why is because of the nature of this case. First, it's affecting somebody on a daily basis. Second, the Second -- the Appellate

Division Second Department is clearly short-staffed and is behind. The sooner we get it there, with the sense of urgency that we wish to have it decided one way or another because of the effect that it might have on other similarly-situated cases, the better for the entire judicial and legal community.

1	So if you need an extra day I can appreciate
2	that.
3	Mr. Kuby, reaction to the next day?
4	MR. KUBY: Whatever you say, Judge.
5	THE COURT: I thank you for that and appreciate
6	the comment.
7	It will be, then will the 27th be sufficient
8	for you?
9	MR. SCHWARTZ: I guess it will have to be, your
10	Honor, but I would request more.
11	THE COURT: I know, and I do want to say that
12	there have been four instances in which this Court has
13	sent orders to the District Attorney, copies to Mr. Kuby,
14	giving them very short time periods in which to comply
15	with certain requirements imposed by the Court. They
16	have been able not only to comply, but even
17	embarrassingly early on one occasion.
18	I thank you very much.
19	MR. KUBY: Thank you, Judge.
20	THE COURT: Thank you. We stand adjourned.
21	* * *
22	I hereby certify that the foregoing
23	is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes in the captioned matter.
24	
25	Lisa M. Porteus, RPR Official Court Reporter